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GPA ACCESSION: LESSONS LEARNED ON THE STRENGTHS AND 
WEAKNESSES OF THE WTO GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
AGREEMENT* 
 
CHRISTOPHER R. YUKINS & JOHANNES S. SCHNITZER 
 
Many member nations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have joined 
the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), a plurilateral agreement 
which aims to open public procurement markets.  Joining the agreement reflects 
a commitment to international free trade, and to the rule of law in public 
procurement.  A revised version of the GPA entered into force in 2014, and 
incorporated many amendments intended to make it easier for developing 
nations to join the GPA.  Among other things, the revised GPA now allows 
developing nations acceding to the GPA to open their public procurement 
markets more slowly, through various transitional measures.  This article 
reviews those changes, and discusses possible solutions to some of the practical 
and legal hurdles which nations face, as they consider accession to the GPA. 
 
 
                                                 
* This article is based, in part, on an earlier piece by co-author Johannes Schnitzer, The 
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement in the EBRD Region, LAW IN TRANSITION 50 
(2013), http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit113e.pdf.  While this article 
uses the familiar acronym “GPA”, from the agreement’s former name, today the agreement 
is formally known as the Agreement on Government Procurement.  See Agreement on 
Government Procurement, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm. 
 Christopher Yukins (cyukins[at]law.gwu.edu) is the Lynn David Research Professor in 
Government Procurement Law at the George Washington University Law School, 
Washington, DC, and co-director of the government procurement law program there; his 
scholarship in U.S., international and comparative public procurement law, available on 
www.ssrn.com, also addresses a wide variety of trade issues related to procurement, and he 
regularly trains internationally on best practices in public procurement. Johannes S. 
Schnitzer (schnitzer[at]schnitzer-law.com) is managing director at SCHNITZER law 
offices, specializing in international public procurement law. He has, for example, recently 
advised Montenegro as well as Ukraine on their respective GPA accession processes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Public procurement has emerged as a critical issue in international trade over the 
last decade, and is becoming a central pillar of the international trading system. The 
reasons for this include not only the sheer volumes involved in public 
and  
 
procurement,1 but also the fact that governments are increasingly aware of the 
economic costs of inadequate public procurement regulations and processes. More 
governments across the world now acknowledge public procurement as an 
important tool for economic development, as well as an instrument of good 
governance. Opening procurement markets internationally as well as harmonizing 
different domestic public procurement regimes have proven to be successful ways 
for governments to facilitate the purchase of goods, services and works at the best 
terms available.2 
 
It is also encouraging to the cause of public procurement law reform that one of 
the most important international standard-setting instruments for public 
procurement policy was recently revised. A new version of the WTO Agreement 
on Government Procurement (‘GPA’), arguably the most important binding 
international agreement on public procurement worldwide, negotiated over more 
than a decade, entered into force in April 2014.3 The GPA is increasingly 
becoming a central force that promotes value for money in public procurement 
worldwide. 
                                                 
1 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) has 
estimated, for example, that its member nations spend an average of approximately 12% of 
their gross domestic products annually on public procurement.  See OECD, Size of Public 
Procurement Market, in GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 148 (2011), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2011-46-en. 
2 For a general introduction see Robert Anderson & William Kovacic, Competition Policy and 
International Trade Liberalisation: Essential Complements to Ensure Good Performance in Public 
Procurement Markets, PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 67-101 (2009); SUE ARROWSMITH, 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (2003); B. 
HOEKMAN & M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM (3rd ed. 2010).  For background on current GPA accession negotiations, see the 
paper by the former negotiator for the Office of the U.S. Trade Negotiator (“USTR”), Jean 
H. Grier, U.S. Perspective on Encouraging Countries to Join the GPA (2015), 
http://trade.djaghe.com/?tag=gpa-accession. 
3 Robert Anderson, The Conclusion of the Renegotiation of the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement: What it Means for the Agreement and for the World Economy, 21 PUB. PROCUREMENT 
L. REV. 83-94 (2012).  For background on the revised GPA that entered into force in April 
2014, including the agreement’s text, see, Agreement on Government Procurement, available 
at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gproc_e.htm.  The revised text of the 
GPA also was set forth in Committee on Government Procurement, Adoption of the Results 
of the Negotiations under Article XXIV:7 of the Agreement on Government Procurement, Following 
Their Verification and Review, As Required by the Ministerial Decision of 15 December 2011 
(GPA/112), Paragraph 5, WTO Doc. No. GPA/113, (Apr. 2, 2012) [hereinafter GPA], a 
comprehensive document which reflected the parties’ related agreements on 
implementation of the revised GPA, available through Integrated Government Procurement 
Market Access Information Portal, WTO, available at https://e-gpa.wto.org/. 
  
 
This paper focuses on why accession to the GPA should be an important public 
procurement policy objective of governments worldwide. It looks at challenges 
frequently faced by acceding countries when negotiating accession to GPA. 
Furthermore, it explains how the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 
(‘UNCITRAL Model Law’),4 which serves as a template available to national 
governments seeking to introduce or reform public procurement legislation for 
their internal markets, interfaces with the GPA, and how using the UNCITRAL 
Model Law can assist countries in joining the GPA. 
 
This paper addresses these issues in several parts.  Part 2 describes the agreement 
and the accession process, and explains why nations may wish to join the GPA -- 
especially given the recent modifications to the agreement.  Part 3 explains how the 
UNCITRAL model law was reformed to ensure that it conformed to the revised 
GPA, so that nations seeking to join the GPA can use the UNCITRAL model law 
as a benchmark for their own laws.  Part 4 offers a brief review of how the GPA 
handles socioeconomic requirements, which can raise serious non-tariff barriers to 
trade.  The paper concludes that accession to the new GPA – a more flexible 
agreement to facilitate international trade in procurement – is an attractive option 
for many nations, so long as they plan and prepare carefully. 
 
II. THE WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
 
A. Why join the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement? 
 
The GPA is a plurilateral agreement within the WTO system, and it provides a 
framework for the conduct of international trade with governments. Currently, 45 
WTO members are bound by the GPA.5 As of August 2015, around 30 WTO 
Members had observer status in the Committee on Government Procurement.6 
                                                 
4 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Public Procurement 2011, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure.html. 
5 The following WTO Members are covered by the Agreement: Armenia; Canada; the 
European Union, including its 28 member states; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Israel; Japan; 
Korea; Liechtenstein; the Kingdom of the Netherlands with respect to Aruba; Montenegro; 
New Zealand; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (“Chinese Taipei”); and the United States. 
6 The WTO Members with observer status in the Committee on Government Procurement 
are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Georgia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Oman, Panama, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Viet Nam. Four 
and  
 
Legally binding market access to the procurement markets of GPA parties is the 
cornerstone of the agreement. Thus, the GPA’s principal (and most obvious) 
objective is to open up national procurement to international competition by 
giving enforceable access to other GPA parties’ procurement markets. Being a 
member to the GPA provides safeguards against future protectionist measures 
introduced by GPA parties. 
The total value of market access opportunities from GPA accession is enormous: it 
is estimated to be in the range of US$ 1.7 trillion.7 Membership allows firms from a 
GPA party to enjoy access to a huge new global market. Accession to the GPA 
therefore constitutes an important step in the development of the acceding 
country’s market economy and in its integration within the international trading 
system. 
 
Interestingly, many countries around the world already grant foreign companies 
access to their national procurement markets. These countries simply do not 
distinguish between domestic and foreign companies in their public procurement 
laws. However, conversely, many GPA countries are either obliged or allowed8 to 
discriminate against companies from non-GPA parties in their public procurement 
processes (in the United States, for example, this concept is referred to as a “walled 
garden”, and means that federal agencies are not, in principle, permitted to 
                                                                                                                       
intergovernmental organizations, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
International Trade Centre (ITC), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade And Development 
(UNCTAD), also have observer status.  The WTO notes that any WTO member or 
observer may submit a written request to the Government Procurement Committee to 
participate in the Committee on Government Procurement as an observer, and may be 
accorded observer status.  The process of becoming an observer, and observers 
participation in the work of the Committee, is described in a decision of the Committee on 
Government Procurement. See Committee on Government Procurement, Decision on 
Procedural Matters Under the Agreement on Government Procurement (1994), WTO Doc. 
No. GPA/1, Annex 1 (Mar. 5, 1996); For recent developments regarding GPA accession 
see, e.g., Johannes S. Schnitzer, Expanding the Membership of the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement: Montenegro and New Zealand Ratifying the Revised GPA, 24 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. 
REV. (2015). 
7 Latest WTO published data (2008) is available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm. 
8 While in many GPA countries, firms from non-GPA parties are not automatically 
disqualified, there are no legal barriers to stop GPA members from excluding firms from 
non-GPA nations. 
  
purchase from companies from nations that do not have a special trading 
relationships with the United States, such as under the GPA).9 
 
GPA accession can, therefore, be an important tool for countries to overcome 
such discrimination and achieve greater fairness in international trade. 
 
B. The Process of Accession to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 
 
Completion of the process of accession to the GPA generally involves two key 
elements:10 
First, the acceding member must proffer a “coverage offer”, and the existing GPA 
members must negotiate and ultimately agree to the acceding nation’s offer, as 
negotiated. The coverage offer, which needs to be negotiated in a series of bilateral 
and plurilateral consultations, sets out a list of the kinds of procurements (that is, 
goods, services and works) and which of the acceding member’s procuring entities 
are obliged to tender these, in accordance with the GPA, and the exceptions and 
derogations that apply.11 Coverage under the GPA, therefore, depends on the 
acceding GPA party’s coverage commitments, and is defined in that party’s 
Appendix I coverage schedule of the GPA, which in turn is divided into seven 
detailed annexes. The annexes define the acceding nation’s coverage as follows: (i) 
Annexes 1, 2 and 3 define which of the acceding party’s central, sub-central and 
“other” entities (such as utilities) respectively are covered by the GPA; (ii) Annexes 
4, 5 and 6 define which goods, services and construction services (works) 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments 
to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 529, 569 (2007) (discussing bar 
against procurement under 19 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) § 2512). 
10 See generally Robert Anderson & Kodjo Osei-Lah, Forging a More Global Procurement Market:  
Issues Concerning Accessions to the Agreement on Government Procurement, in THE WTO REGIME 
ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 67-69 (Sue Arrowsmith & 
Robert Anderson eds., 2011) [hereinafter THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND REFORM]. The text cited here, offers excellent 
background on the GPA’s revision, including an important introductory chapter 1, The 
WTO Regime on Government Procurement:  Past Present and Future, by, who were also the editors 
of that volume.  Robert Anderson leads the WTO Secretariat team which worked on 
revision of the GPA, and Professor Sue Arrowsmith heads the public procurement law 
program at the University of Nottingham, a leading international center of procurement 
law.  Their edited volume followed on Sue Arrowsmith’s earlier, close analysis of the 1994 
version of the GPA, Government Procurement in the WTO, cited supra note 1, which is probably 
the most comprehensive text available on the earlier agreement. 
11 Under the GPA, typically no GPA party opens all of its public procurement to foreign 
competition. Instead, based on a series of negotiations, detailed below, each GPA party 
specifies the procurement that it will open to the other GPA parties. 
and  
 
respectively are to be covered; and (iii) Annex 7 sets forth general notes (special 
exclusions and other matters). 
 
Negotiating the coverage offer usually requires a certain amount of preparation 
and political coordination between all stakeholders. Our experience in the field 
indicates that the monetary threshold level above which the GPA will apply, entity 
coverage under Annex 3, which lists the “other entities”, and special exclusions 
and other matters under Annex 7, are often crucial issues in accession negotiations. 
Annex 3 addresses the coverage of state-owned enterprises and/or utility 
companies (frequently in the area of energy, transport and related sectors). 
Practical experience also shows that an acceding party is frequently asked to submit 
one or more revised offers for the purpose of clarifying or improving its initial 
offer. Generally, the process of coverage negotiations is highly flexible and allows 
room for individual approaches.12 
 
Second, the GPA requires acceding parties to ensure the conformity of their laws 
and regulations with the GPA’s obligations. This may require changes to existing 
national public procurement rules. The GPA generally takes the approach of 
establishing only limited common ground rules to which acceding parties must 
conform their procurement laws.  In this regard, one of the most important GPA 
requirements is compliance with the core principles of national treatment and non-
discrimination,13 which obliges GPA parties not to treat suppliers from the other 
GPA parties less favourably than their own national suppliers (national treatment), 
nor to treat the enterprises of one GPA party less favourably than those of another 
(non-discrimination); in both cases, these general obligations are bounded by the 
GPA member’s limitations to coverage. Another important (and mandatory) 
requirement is compliance with procedural provisions. These procedural 
provisions include certain aspects of the procurement process (such as 
transparency), and enforcement – including, importantly, provisions on domestic 
review, which must provide for timely, effective and non-discriminatory 
administrative or judicial review procedures through which a supplier may 
challenge a breach of the GPA (or challenge the adequacy of the legal provisions 
that implement the GPA).14 
                                                 
12 See, for instance, the recent case of Montenegro, which submitted its initial Appendix I 
offer on 4 November 2013, its first revised offer on 28 November 2013, its second revised 
offer on 18 June 2014, and its final offer on 18 July 2014. 
13 GPA, supra note 2, art. IV. 
14 These “domestic review” procedures are outlined in Article XVIII of the revised GPA.  
Domestic review procedures (also called “remedies” or “challenge” procedures, or (in the 
United States) “bid protest” procedures) are now quite common, worldwide; the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, for example, describes appropriate challenge procedures in detail 
in Chapter VIII.  See generally Daniel I. Gordon, Constructing a Bid Protest Process: Choices Every 
  
 
An acceding party is required to submit information regarding its domestic public 
procurement legislation, in the form of replies to a “Checklist of issues”.15 This 
allows a review of the acceding party’s national public procurement legislation. 
Bilateral and plurilateral consultations usually provide a forum to clarify, as 
necessary, any aspect of the domestic public procurement legislation. Consultations 
may lead to the acceding party being asked to amend its legislation to ensure 
conformity with GPA requirements. The involvement of an independent body to 
compare the party’s national public procurement legislation with the requirements 
of the GPA has proven to be beneficial in the past.16 
 
C. Why join the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement now? 
 
There is a renewed interest in accession to the GPA, one of the main reasons for 
which is the revision of the GPA text, which was completed in 2012 and entered 
into force in 2014.17 This update of the GPA has brought a streamlined and 
                                                                                                                       
Procurement Challenge System Must Make, 35 PUB. CONT. L. J. 427 (2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=892781. 
15 For documents related to the accession process, see WTO, General Overview of WTO Work 
on Government Procurement, available at  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/overview_e.htm. 
16 In the case of Armenia, such assistance was provided by SIGMA – a governance institute 
associated with the OECD, and supported by the European Union (EU). Clearly, it is 
logical that other international organizations, such as, for instance, the EBRD (alone or 
together with SIGMA or another governance institute), be involved in conducting analyses 
of the domestic public procurement laws of acceding parties with respect to the GPA. The 
EBRD, for example, has been at the forefront of the process of supporting legal and 
institutional reform in the EBRD countries of operation, providing assistance to 
governments to ensure that national public procurement regulations are in line with 
international standards and best practices.  See, e.g., Public Procurement – Improving public 
procurement in the EBRD region, http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/sectors/legal-
reform/public-procurement.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
17 The revised GPA entered into force on April 6, 2014, 30 days after the submission of 
formal acceptances of the ‘Protocol Amending the Agreement on Government 
Procurement’ by two thirds of the GPA parties. See World Trade Organisation, Revised 
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement Enters into Force, Apr. 7, 2014, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/gpro_07apr14_e.htm.  These (ten) 
parties were: Liechtenstein – WT/Let/883, dated 15 May 2013; Norway – WT/Let/912, 
dated 18 Nov. 2013; Canada - WT/Let/913, dated 20 Nov. 2013; Chinese Taipei – 
WT/Let/914, dated 29 Nov. 2013; the United States – WT/Let/915, dated 2 December 
2013; Hong Kong, China – WT/Let/916, dated 2 Dec. 2013; the European Union – 
WT/Let/917, dated 3 Dec. 2013; Iceland – WT/Let/933, dated 28 Feb. 2014; Singapore – 
and  
 
modernized regime, enhancing the agreement’s flexibility and user-friendliness. 
Improvements include new accommodations for electronic tools 
(‘eProcurement’),18 and the right of procuring entities to shorten notice periods 
when electronic tools are used in order to improve effectiveness and transparency. 
Furthermore, the new text of the GPA enhances transitional measures for 
developing countries, including price preferences and offsets, the phased-in 
addition of specific procuring entities, and the setting of procurements thresholds 
at a provisionally higher level than the permanent level.19 
 
A further reason for the high level of interest in accession is that as a consequence 
of the expansion of membership, the coverage of the agreement is very likely to 
expand significantly. The Committee on Government Procurement has moved 
ahead on multiple accessions within the last few months. Importantly, New 
Zealand and Montenegro completed accession negotiations in October 2014, and 
joined the GPA formally in mid-2015.20 Moldova completed its accession 
negotiations in early 2015. Ukraine, despite current geopolitical challenges, is 
moving ahead quickly with its GPA accession, having circulated its final offer in 
June 2015.21 Tajikistan circulated its initial offer in February 2015,22 and Pakistan 
                                                                                                                       
WT/Let/934, dated 28 Feb. 2014; and Israel – WT/Let/935, dated 7 Mar. 2014. Japan and 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands with respect to Aruba submitted their respective 
instruments of acceptance subsequently (see WT/Let/936, dated 17 Mar. 2014 for Japan, 
and WT/Let/945, dated 6 June 2014 for the Kingdom of the Netherlands with respect to 
Aruba. 
18 See, e.g., GPA, supra note 2, art. IV.3, of the revised agreement, which requires measures 
to ensure that electronic procurement is not implemented in a discriminatory manner. 
19 See GPA, supra note 2, art. V.3.  For a discussion of how coverage exceptions are critical 
to GPA accession of major developing nations, such as India, see, e.g., S. Chakravarthy & 
Kamala Dawar, India’s Possible Accession to the Agreement on Government Procurement:  What Are 
the Pros and Cons, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE 
AND REFORM, supra note 9, at 129 (“The biggest challenge for the Indian negotiators . . . is 
in defining those sensitive and critical sectors of the economy that need to be excluded 
from the coverage of the GPA during the accession negotiations.”). 
20 See Johannes S. Schnitzer, Expanding the Membership of the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement: Montenegro and New Zealand Ratifying the Revised GPA, 24 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. 
REV. (2015). 
21 With respect to Ukraine’s eventual accession to the GPA, the Committee on 
Government Procurement has stated as follows: “The Committee notes that the accession 
of Ukraine to the GPA would represent a significant addition to the market access 
commitments under the Agreement. Furthermore, it considers that the GPA’s principles 
and requirements can play a significant role in strengthening relevant institutions in 
Ukraine. On this basis, and subject to further discussions, it is hoped that Ukraine’s 
accession can be concluded in the first half of 2015.” Committee on Government 
Procurement, Report (2014) of the WTO Committee on Government Procurement, ¶ 3.27, 
  
became an observer to the GPA in the same month. China, which applied for 
GPA accession in 2007,23 presented its fifth revised offer in December 2014 and 
GPA parties, despite frustration expressed at the pace of progress,24 are hopeful 
that China’s GPA accession will be brought to a successful conclusion in the near 
future.25 
 
Furthermore, the GPA is particularly relevant for nations in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (“CIS”), and a number of 
countries in that region are currently seeking accession to the GPA. Acceding to 
the GPA opens potential trade opportunities for these nations, and reaffirms their 
                                                                                                                       
GPA/126 (Nov., 2014) [hereinafter Report (2014)]. See also World Trade Organisation, 
Government Procurement: Committee on Government Procurement Moves Ahead on Multiple Accessions 
(Feb. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Government Procurement: Moves Ahead on Multiple Accessions], 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/gpro_11feb15_e.htm. 
22 Committee on Government Procurement, Application for Accession to the Agreement on 
Government Procurement: Communication from Tajikistan, GPA/127 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
23 See, e.g., Ping Wang, China’s Accession to WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement:  Domestic 
Challenges and Prospects in Negotiation (Mar. 2009), 
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/briefings/briefing-48-china-gpa-
ascension.pdf; Ping Wang, Accession to the Agreement on Government Procurement:  The Case of 
China, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND 
REFORM, supra note 9. 
24 In the meeting of the WTO Committee on Government Procurement in February 2015, 
China said that it would, in principle, not be willing to make significant further additions to 
its market access offer as included in its fifth revised offer dated December 2014. The GPA 
parties, although acknowledging improvements made by China in its fifth revised offer, 
noted that they are not willing to accept China’s latest market access offer. Significant gaps 
need to be addressed. See Government Procurement:  Moves Ahead on Multiple Accessions, supra 
note 20. China said it would be it difficult or impossible for it to improve the offer but that 
it was ready to continue discussions on proposed exceptions.  The chairman said both sides 
should not lose sight of the benefits at stake in the negotiations.  He urged the Chinese 
delegation to go back to its capital to seek new flexibility while calling on GPA parties to 
remain pragmatic in their expectations and approach to the negotiations. 
25 As noted, China is currently negotiating accession. China becoming a GPA party would 
in itself add billions of dollars annually to the value of total procurements covered. With 
respect to recent developments regarding China’s eventual accession to the GPA, see the 
2014 Annual Report to the WTO’s General Council, in which the GPA parties stated as 
follows: “China’s GPA accession, on the appropriate terms, is a matter of great significance 
for the Agreement, for the WTO, and for the world economy; and a very important signal 
for other emerging economies. Essentially, to conclude the accession it is looking for terms 
of participation on China’s part that are comparable to those of the existing Parties. The 
alignment of China’s relevant legislation with GPA norms is also vital to conclude the 
accession. The Committee hopes for significant progress toward a conclusion of China’s 
accession in the remainder of 2014 and in 2015.”; Report (2014), supra note 20, at 3.18. 
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commitment to the rule of law, and their rejection of corruption.  Other countries 
in the region (for instance, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mongolia 
and Russia) have provisions in their respective WTO Accession Protocols which 
commit them to seek accession to the GPA in the near future. 
 
Finally, joining the GPA is also a logical and natural step for countries that are in 
the process of reforming their domestic laws and adapting them to international 
best public procurement practices. Being a party to the GPA can be seen by 
foreign investors as a “stamp of approval”, indicating that the domestic public 
procurement regime is consistent with international best practice. It is, therefore, 
only natural that a number of countries, which are currently in the process of 
modernizing their domestic procurement laws, are also likely  to join the club of 
GPA members within the next couple of years. 
 
Due to the intensified interest in GPA accession, the WTO Secretariat has 
intensified its technical assistance activities.26 With regard to capacity building 
activities as well as technical assistance for potential GPA parties, the WTO 
Secretariat, for instance, entered into an informal arrangement with the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Under this framework, a 
series of workshops has already been delivered for participating countries such as 
Moldova, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkey, Montenegro, and 
Ukraine. Importantly, EBRD has been providing technical assistance to 
Montenegro, Moldova and Ukraine with respect to eventual accession to the 
GPA.27 Recently, these three countries made considerable progress in their GPA 
accession process.28 
 
                                                 
26 See World Trade Organization, Technical Cooperation Activities, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gptech_coop_e.htm. 
27 Technical assistance includes, for instance, seminars to aid better understanding of the 
GPA accession process; assistance in drafting negations offers (initial offer, revised offers 
and the final offer); assistance during accession negotiations in Geneva including strategic 
advice; assistance in drafting GPA compliant public procurement legislation; assistance in 
GPA implementation; etc. 
28 Montenegro ratified the GPA and was to join the GPA on July 15, 2015. World Trade 
Organisation, Montenegro Ratifies Revised WTO Procurement Pact (June 15, 2015), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/gpro_15jun15_e.htm.  Moldova 
circulated its final offer in 2015 and it is expected that this offer will prove acceptable to all 
GPA parties. Ukraine is currently working on its third revised offer. On this basis, Ukraine 
and several GPA parties expressed their hope that Ukraine’s accession could also be 
concluded in the near future. For a report on progress by Moldova and Ukraine, see World 
Trade Organisation, Committee on Government Procurement Moves Ahead on Multiple Accessions 
(Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/gpro_11feb15_e.htm. 
 
 
D. The benefits of the revised text of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 
 
The revised GPA replaces the old GPA (1994). As noted, the revised agreement 
entered into force in April 2014, 30 days after two-thirds of the GPA parties 
accepted the Protocol amending the Agreement.29 As indicated above, the 
renegotiation of the GPA addressed two major areas of reform:30 
First, the GPA’s original text, which sets out minimum standards that procuring 
entities must observe when tendering covered procurement, was streamlined and 
modernized to reflect, for instance, modern procurement techniques including 
electronic procurement tools and allows for shortened timelines – e.g. deadlines 
for bid submission – when electronic means are used.31 It also includes new 
provisions with regard to good governance and the fight against corruption, 
including an important requirement that procuring entities must conduct covered 
tender procedures in a manner that avoids conflicts of interest and prevents 
corrupt practices.32 Such an express provision regarding the fight against 
corruption is unique in the context of WTO agreements.33 
                                                 
29 In this respect it must be noted that the revised GPA is not in force for all Parties. It is in 
force for Canada, the European Union (including its 28 Member States); Hong Kong, 
China; Iceland; Israel; Japan; Liechtenstein; the Netherlands with respect to Aruba; 
Norway; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; and the United States. As of this writing, Armenia, 
Korea and Switzerland still needed to formally accept the revised GPA (See Report (2014), 
supra note 20. 
30 See for background, Robert D. Anderson, The Conclusion of the Renegotiation of the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement:  What It Means for the Agreement and for the World Economy, 
21 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 83-93 (2012) and Robert D. Anderson, Steven Schooner 
& Collin Swan, Feature Comment: The WTO’s Revised Government Procurement Agreement: An 
Important Milestone Toward Greater Market Access and Transparency in Global Public Procurement 
Markets, 54 GOVT. CONTRACTOR 1-6 (2012) [hereinafter Anderson, Schooner & Swan, 
Feature Comment]. 
31 See Sue Arrowsmith, The Revised Agreement on Government Procurement: Changes to the 
Procedural Rules and other Transparency Provisions, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 9, at 285–336. 
32 See Article IV(4) GPA as well as the preamble to the Agreement, recognizing the 
importance of transparency and impartiality in public procurement. See also Robert D. 
Anderson, The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA): An Emerging Tool of Global 
Integration and Good Governance, LAW IN TRANSITION 1/8, 5/8 (2010), 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/news/lit102.pdf; Robert D. Anderson, 
William E. Kovacic & Anna C. Müller, Ensuring Integrity and Competition in Public Procurement 
Markets: a Dual Challenge for Good Governance, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 9, at 681-718. 
33 For a critical discussion of these anti-corruption measures, see Sue Arrowsmith, The 
Revised Agreement on Government Procurement:  Changes in the Procedural Rules and Other 
and  
 
 
Second, the coverage under the GPA was extended by additional market access 
commitments.34 This was done in particular by adding more than 500 procurement 
entities under the GPA, by covering additional types of contracts,35 and by 
reducing thresholds applied by certain GPA parties. The expansion of market 
access commitments due to the revised GPA is estimated to be worth 
approximately US$ 80-100 billion per year.36 
 
Besides these two main elements, the revision of the GPA had further important 
purposes. It has been revised to facilitate the accession of new parties, notably 
developing countries, by allowing for special and differential treatment (see 
Subpart E below).37 Additionally, as part of the renegotiation of the GPA, the 
                                                                                                                       
Transparency Provisions, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT:  
CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 9, at 288-292. 
34 Importantly, Canada covered, for the first time, the sub-central level of governments (i.e., 
Canada’s provinces and territories). See David Collins, Canada’s Sub-Central Government 
Entities and the Agreement on Government Procurement: Past and Present, in THE WTO REGIME ON 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 9, at 175–196. For a 
thorough discussion of the conceptual framework for the coverage negotiations that led to 
the revised GPA, and of the practical steps undertaken in those coverage negotiations, see 
Robert D. Anderson & Kodjo Osei-Lah, The Coverage Negotiations Under the Agreement on 
Government Procurement:  Context, Mandate, Process and Prospects, in THE WTO REGIME ON 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT:  CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 9, at 149-174.  
35 All GPA parties agreed to cover the full range of constructions services (i.e., works); see, 
e.g., Anderson, Schooner & Swan, Feature Comment, supra note 29, at 3. In addition, many 
GPA parties offered additional types of goods and services (in particular 
telecommunication services). The European Union, Japan and Korea even covered a 
certain type of “Public-Private Partnership” contract, namely “BOT” (build-operate-
transfer) contracts. See, e.g., WTO, The Re-negotiation of the Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA),  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/negotiations_e.htm. 
36 See Robert D. Anderson, Philippe Pelletier, Kodjo Osei-Lah, & Anna Müller Assessing the 
Value of Future Accessions to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA): Some New 
Data Sources, Provisional Estimates, and an Evaluative Framework for Individual WTO Members 
Considering Accession, 21(4) PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 113–138, and see, Eigth WTO 
Ministerial Conference, Report by the Director-General, WT/MIN(11)/5 (Nov. 18, 2011), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min11_e/min11_5_e.pdf; see also 
OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., Fact Sheet: Benefits for the United States from the Revised WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement, Dec. 2011, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/december/benefits-united-states-revised-wto-
government-procur. 
37 For a comprehensive review, see  Anna Caroline Müller, Special and Differential Treatment 
and Other Special Measures for Developing Countries under the Agreement on Government Procurement: 
the Current Text and New Provisions, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT 
 
 
parties to the GPA agreed to open a new round of work programs under the WTO 
Committee on Government Procurement, including work programs on small and 
medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”), and on sustainability in public procurement 
(see Part IV below). These work programs will allow the parties to the GPA to 
extend their discussions of issues, such as (beyond sustainability and SMEs) safety 
standards and the collection of statistical information on procurement, at least 
some of which were raised but not concluded during negotiations on the revised 
GPA. 
 
E. Transitional measures to facilitate accession by developing and least-developed economies 
 
i. General 
 
Over many decades, the general impression of the GPA was that it was open only 
to the most developed countries. This view was supported by looking at the actual 
parties to the GPA – an “elite club” including the United States, the Member 
States of the European Union, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong, China and Singapore. 
The revised GPA makes it clear that developing or transition economies are 
particularly encouraged to accede to the GPA.38 Special measures introduced for 
developing countries confirm that great importance was attached to facilitating the 
accession of such new members to the GPA. To this end, transitional measures 
allow for “special and differential treatment” for developing countries that accede 
to the GPA. As the name suggests, transitional measures are temporary and their 
application is time-bound. These measures serve the purpose of granting acceding 
countries a certain degree of flexibility for allowing domestic industry to adapt to 
increased foreign competition during a limited period of time. The intention is to 
avoid economic ‘shocks’ to more vulnerable sectors of the domestic economy, and 
to permit domestic industry to adapt gradually to increased foreign competition. 
 
ii. Types of differential treatment 
 
The core purpose of transitional measures is, as noted above, to provide breathing 
space for the domestic industry of a developing nation when it joins the GPA 
regime.  Such measures under the revised GPA include flexibility for: (a) price 
preferences; (b) offsets; (c) phased-in additions of specific entities and sectors; as 
                                                                                                                       
PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 9, at 339-376 [Müller, Special & 
Differential Treatment]. 
38 Article V of the revised GPA contains a set of special provisions on developing 
countries. See generally Müller, Special & Differential Treatment, supra note 36. 
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well as (d) thresholds that are initially set higher than their permanent levels.39 
Developing countries are free to negotiate the use of these measures with the GPA 
parties in their accession process.40 In any event, the exact terms and conditions of 
transitional measures must be spelled out in Appendix I i.e. the coverage schedule 
of the respective developing country. These transitional measures have been 
discussed briefly, as follows: 
 
a) Price preferences, typically afforded to domestic bidders, result in a discriminatory 
treatment (an otherwise illegitimate comparative advantage) of domestic and 
foreign bids. Price preferences may take different forms. For instance, a procuring 
entity may be required always to accept a bid by a domestic company over a 
foreign firm’s bid, so long as the difference in price does not exceed a specific 
margin of preference. A similar example would be that the prices offered by 
domestic companies are discounted by a certain percentage (e.g., 5%) over the 
prices of foreign firms.41 Art V.3.a of the GPA stipulates that developing countries 
are allowed to make use of price preferences.42 In any event, price preferences are 
                                                 
39 See also GPA, supra note 2, art IV.4, which relates to delayed application of specific 
substantive GPA obligations other than the most favored nation (“MFN”) principle. The 
implementation period shall be five years for a least developed country, after its accession 
to the GPA; and for any other developing country, ‘only the period necessary to implement 
the specific obligation and not to exceed three years’. 
40 Robert D. Anderson, Reflections on Bagwell and Staiger in Light of the Revised WTO Agreement 
on Government Procurement, in GLOBALIZATION IN AN AGE OF CRISIS: MULTILATERAL 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Robert C. Feenstra & Alan 
M. Taylor eds., 2014). 
41 These price preferences are not used by developing nations alone; for goods not covered 
by free trade agreements (such as the GPA), for example, under the Buy American Act as 
implemented per the Federal Acquisition Regulation, a U.S. federal agency is to apply a 
price preference of up to 12 percent. FAR 25.105, 48 C.F.R. § 25.105, 
www.acquisition.gov. 
42 Article V states, in pertinent part: 
 
3. Based on its development needs, and with the agreement of the Parties, a 
developing country 
may adopt or maintain one or more of the following transitional measures, during 
a transition period 
and in accordance with a schedule, set out in its relevant annexes to Appendix I, 
and applied in a 
manner that does not discriminate among the other Parties: 
 
(a) a price preference programme, provided that the programme: 
 
 
 
limited in different ways: first, the price preference and its application must be 
transparent and clearly described in the tender notice; second, price preferences are 
permitted only with respect to (i) goods or services (i.e., not construction services), 
and (ii) such goods and services must originate principally in the developing 
country applying the preference.43 
 
b) Offsets are defined in Art 1.1. GPA as “any condition or undertaking that 
encourages local development or improves a Party’s balance-of-payments 
accounts, such as the use of domestic content, the licensing of technology, 
investment, counter-trade and similar action or requirement”. The GPA includes 
the general rule that GPA parties ‘shall not seek, take account of, impose or 
enforce any offset’.44 The GPA, however, provides an exception to this rule for 
developing countries, allowing such countries to adopt offsets “provided that any 
requirement for, or consideration of, the imposition of the offset is clearly stated” 
                                                                                                                       
(i) provides a preference only for the part of the tender incorporating 
goods or services originating in the developing country applying the 
preference or goods or services originating in other developing countries 
in respect of which the developing country applying the preference has 
an obligation to provide national treatment under a preferential 
agreement, provided that where the other developing country is a Party 
to this Agreement, such treatment would be subject to any conditions set 
by the Committee; and  
 
(ii) is transparent, and the preference and its application in the 
procurement are clearly described in the notice of intended procurement; 
43 Price preferences are, according to Art V.3 GPA, also allowed ‘for goods or services 
originating in other developing countries in respect of which the developing country 
applying the preference has an obligation to provide national treatment under a preferential 
agreement, provided that where the other developing country is a Party to this Agreement, 
such treatment would be subject to any conditions set by the Committee’. 
44 See GPA, supra note 2, art IV.6. While offsets are generally disfavored in many 
industrialized nations, in part because they raise risks of corruption -- a government buyer 
may demand, for example, that the seller purchase services from a favored local vendor as 
an offset, see, e.g., Ben Magahy, Francisco Vilhena da Cunha & Mark Pyman, Defence Offsets: 
Addressing the Risks of Corruption and Raising Transparency, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Apr., 2011), 
http://archive.transparency.org/publications/publications/subject/%28topic%29/21#sth
ash.mzX4HwD1.dpuf, offsets are still strongly favored by many policymakers, see, e.g., 
Anuradha Mitra, A Survey of Successful Offset Experiences Worldwide, 3(1) J. DEFENSE STUDIES 
(Jan., 2009). 
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in the tender notice. Under Article V.3 of the revised GPA, therefore, a procuring 
entity in a developing country may negotiate with GPA parties, for example, to be 
permitted to impose an offset requirement that a contractor, once awarded a 
contract, make an offsetting investment in local production capacity. 
 
c) As noted, a GPA party must define those procuring entities and sectors the GPA 
applies to in its coverage schedule in Appendix I. Entities on the federal level (e.g., 
ministries) are to be specified in Annex 1, entities on the sub-federal level (e.g., 
regions, provinces, municipalities or cities) in Annex 2 and other entities (e.g., 
state-owned companies and companies in the utilities sector) in Annex 3. Covered 
goods need to be specified in Annex 4, covered services in Annex 5 and covered 
construction services (works) in Annex 6. The GPA allows developing countries to 
negotiate with GPA parities the exclusion of certain procuring entities or sectors 
from coverage for a certain period of time after accession to the GPA. However, 
initially excluded procuring entities or sectors must be added (phased-in) within a 
time schedule, to be agreed with other GPA members. This would, for instance, 
allow a developing country to negotiate so that certain state-owned enterprises in 
the utilities sector (e.g., a provider of electricity) or an entire sector of the industry 
(e.g., the sector of sewage and refuse disposal) be required to procure according to 
GPA rules only after a certain ‘grace period’. 
 
d) Only procurements for which the estimated contract value equals or exceeds the 
relevant thresholds specified in the relevant GPA Party’s annexes to Appendix I 
coverage schedule are covered by the GPA. Developing countries are also free to 
negotiate that thresholds initially be set at a higher level than permanent 
thresholds. Thresholds are to be specified in Annexes 1-3 (i.e., the entity coverage) 
and differ for goods, services and works. The “standard” monetary thresholds (in 
“Standard Drawing Rights”, or SDRs, a benchmark compiled from a basket of 
currencies) are as follows: 
 
 
ANNEX 1 ANNEX 2 ANNEX 3 
Good
s 
Servic
es 
Constru
ction 
services 
Good
s 
Service
s 
Construc
tion 
services 
Good
s 
Servic
es 
Constructi
on services 
130,0
00 
130,0
00 
5,000,00
0 
200,0
00 
200,00
0 
5,000,000 400,0
00 
400,0
00 
5,000,000 
 
A developing country could therefore, for instance, negotiate that the thresholds 
for entities covered under Annex 3 (other entities) initially be set at SDR 8,000,000 
and that this threshold be reduced annually by EUR 500,000 over the first six years 
 
 
of its membership of the GPA. In any case, the developing country will always 
need to negotiate any higher initial threshold and any lower permanent threshold, 
as well as the time schedule for the threshold’s reduction. 
 
The revised GPA even allows post-accession flexibilities for developing countries. 
These include an extension of initially agreed transition or implementation periods, 
as well as (potentially) new transitional measures.45 The latter are, however, limited 
to special circumstances that were unforeseen during the accession process.46 
 
iii. Why are waivers from the non-discrimination principles allowed? 
 
In this respect, it must be noted that special and differential provisions constitute a 
major deviation from the non-discrimination principles contained in the GPA, i.e., 
the principle of national treatment and the most favored nation (MFN) principle.47 
Special and differential provisions have the opposite result – 48 they allow countries 
to treat domestic industry more favourably than foreign industry (e.g., a foreign 
bidder may not be allowed to participate in a tender at all, or a bid by a domestic 
bidder may receive better treatment than a bid from a foreign supplier). 
 
One of the main reasons for special and differential provisions is, as mentioned 
above, temporary market protection.49 The GPA has, in contrast, one principal 
purpose: to dismantle trade barriers between national markets, and contribute to 
an increasing liberalization of the GPA parties’ procurement markets and, 
consequently, to stimulate the exchange of goods and services on the basis of 
                                                 
45 GPA, supra note 2, art V.6.a-b. 
46 Specifically, the Committee on Government Procurement in the WTO may, on 
application by the developing nation, “approve the adoption of a new transitional measure . 
…in special circumstances that were unforeseen during the accession process.” Id. art. 
V.6.b. 
47 The MFN principle requires that products or services from any one GPA party receive 
treatment no less favourable than like products and services from other GPA parties, i.e., 
the same degree of liberalization shall be offered as to all other GPA members. The 
principle of national treatment requires that companies as well as their goods and services 
from other GPA parties be given the same treatment as national companies as well as 
national goods and services. 
48 See Alexander Keck & Patrick Low, Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, 
When and How?, 11 (WTO Staff Working Paper No. ERSD-2004-03, 2004), available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200403_e.htm. 
49 See also John Whalley, Non-Discriminatory Discrimination: Special and Differential Treatment 
Under the GATT for Developing Countries, ECO. J. 1318, 1322 (1990). 
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comparative competitive advantages.50 Membership in the GPA therefore should 
allow foreign bidders to participate in public tender procedures in other GPA 
parties under the same terms and conditions domestic suppliers enjoy. Under the 
GPA’s guiding principles, in other words, ultimately the bidder which offers best 
value for money should win a public contract, regardless of the bidder’s origin, or 
the origin of the goods or services it provides. 
 
Although international studies show that increased competition and transparency 
due to the opening of (national) procurement markets have positive effects,51 some 
governments still tend to be reluctant to (further) liberalize in this respect.52 The 
                                                 
50 See Johannes Schnitzer, Regulating Public Procurement Law at Supranational Level: The Example 
of EU Agreements on Public Procurement, J. PUB. PROCUREMENT 301-334 (2010)[hereinafter 
Schnitzer, Regulating Public Procurement]; Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the 
Normative Economics of International Trade Policy, 34 J. INT’L. ECO. L. 49-82 (1998). 
51 In charting a course of open procurement markets in the 1980s, the European 
Commission predicted that the liberalisation of procurement markets should, in principle, 
have a number of significant economic benefits. The three most important of these 
benefits are, first, the so-called “static trade effect”, which concerns saving resources by 
purchasing high value products and services from foreign industry, followed by the 
“competition effect”, which pressures governments to open up procurement markets 
domestically and that will result in better value, and finally the “restructuring effect”, which 
concerns the beneficial savings from restructuring inefficient businesses. See, e.g., SUE 
ARROWSMITH ET AL., EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 51-52 (2010) 
(citing Paulo Cecchini, The European Challenge: the Benefits of a Single Market, sec. 3 (1988)).; see 
also Commission of the European Communities, A Report on the Functioning of Public 
Procurement Markets in the EU: Benefits from the Application Of The EU Directives and Challenges for 
the Future (Feb. 3, 2004), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/public-proc-market-final-
report_en.pdf. 
52 The core idea of the theory of comparative advantage, most famously put forward by the 
Scottish theorist Adam Smith in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations, is that free trade between 
states maximises both the aggregate wealth of the two states as well as the wealth of each 
of the two individually. This exchange (of goods or services) thus allows each country to 
specialize in those areas in which it has an absolute or relative competitive advantage over 
the other country. This means that it saves production resources otherwise used in 
economically inefficient production processes, and instead moves resources to more 
efficient production processes. Hence, countries should import such goods for which they 
have no competitive advantage in producing, and export such goods as they have 
specialised in producing. Reduction, or ideally avoidance, of autarkic behaviour then results 
in the optimisation of national and global wealth. Nonetheless, present day foreign trade 
policy in all market economies is basically determined by this liberal economics theory. 
Numerous studies by renowned economists have delivered empirical proof for the validity 
of the comparative advantage theory, showing that growth in wealth is substantially smaller 
when there are trade barriers than when free trade is allowed – even for the country which 
 
 
rationale for this is often of a political nature.53 To this end, many governments 
across the globe impose “buy-domestic” measures that favour domestic-made 
products over foreign products in government procurement.54 Special and 
differential measures legally justify a deviation from the GPA’s core principle of 
non-discrimination on a temporary basis. The purpose is to give special 
consideration to the development, financial and trade needs and other 
circumstances of developing countries. 
 
Two points bear special emphasis here, based on the authors’ practical experience 
working with nations contemplating accession to the GPA.  First, the very limited, 
transitional protections allowed to developing nations may, in fact, reflect 
industrialized nations’ assumption that firms supplying governments in developing 
nations can simply adjust to foreign competition -- and if those firms cannot 
adjust, that those nations can afford to let those firms die.  Very often, however, 
the ties between those firms and their governments are deep, complex and 
mutually reinforcing,55 and policymakers in those developing nations may 
legitimately fear that exposing those firms to foreign competition could prove to 
                                                                                                                       
sets up the trade barriers. See Schnitzer, Regulating Public Procurement, supra note 49, at 301-
334 and Johannes S. Schnitzer, The External Sphere of Public Procurement Law: Bi-Regional Trade 
Relations from the Perspective of the European Community, 14 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 63-90 
(2005). 
53 For a discussion of the birth of the Buy American Act -- probably the best-known 
example of a domestic preference law -- in the broader context of advancing U.S. public 
procurement law, see Khi Thai & Rick Grimm, Government Procurement:  Past and Current 
Developments, 12:2 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCOUNTING & FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 231-47 
(2000). 
54 See, for instance, the current concerns of several GPA parties with regard to U.S. federal 
and state legislative measures which “increase domestic content requirements in 
procurement conducted by federal, state and municipal-level entities”. These concerns were 
recently raised at meetings of the WTO Committee on Government Procurement in June 
2014 and February 2015. See Canada Reiterates Concern over Recent U.S. Buy-America Actions, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TRADE & DEV. CANADA (June 27, 2014), 
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/comm/news-
communiques/2014/06/27b.aspx?lang=eng. 
55 See, e.g., Mona Frøystad, Kari K. Heggstad & Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad, Linking Procurement 
and Political Economy (2010), http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3955-linking-
procurement-and-political-economy-a-gui.pdf.  China’s potential accession to the GPA, for 
example, has been stalled in part by the question of whether procurement by state-owned 
enterprises -- an important part of the economic and political fabric of China -- should be 
opened under the GPA.  See, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, China’s GPA Accession: U.S. Industry 
Identifies Deficiencies (June 9, 2014), http://trade.djaghe.com/?tag=china-state-owned-
enterprises. 
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be badly destabilizing.  Negotiators from the existing member states enjoy a 
substantial negotiating advantage -- they are many, negotiating with one (see 
below) -- and existing members should be careful not to collapse the negotiations 
by pressing too aggressively on the assumption that opening procurement markets 
is simply a matter of dry statistics, without potentially serious social, economic and 
political risks. 
 
Second, those risks are compounded by a lack of information, for governments in 
many developing nations lack efficient mechanisms to exchange information with 
industry on the potential effects of opening procurement markets, or for assessing 
the limited data available.  That lack of information in developing nations contrasts 
sharply with the robust information available to negotiators in member nations.  
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, for example, regularly exchanges 
information with industry through a mature, sophisticated (and largely closed) 
system of advisory committees, established by law.56  Information exchanges give 
industry an early opportunity to object to new openings for foreign competition, 
and they reduce risk for government trade negotiators as they assess new 
agreements to open public procurement markets.  Negotiators from industrialized 
nations should recognize that where efficient mechanisms for exchanging and 
assessing information do not exist in nations contemplating GPA accession, the 
negotiators from those nations, working in an informational vacuum, will naturally 
tend to be much more cautious when they open procurement markets to foreign 
competition. 
 
iv. Which nations should seek accession and how can they enjoy special and differential 
treatment? 
 
The revised GPA refers to “developing” countries, and makes it clear that this 
term also covers least developed countries.57 The GPA, however, does not include 
any definition of developing countries or least developed countries. Therefore, it 
                                                 
56 The advisory committees are described on the U.S. Trade Representative’s website, 
available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/advisory-committees.  For a critical discussion of 
how exchanges with industry occur in practice, see Timothy B. Lee, E-mails Show Cozy 
Relationship Between Obama Trade Negotiators and Industry Groups, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 
29, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/29/e-mails-
show-cozy-relationship-between-obama-trade-negotiators-and-industry-groups/. 
57 Article V.1 states, in relevant part: “In negotiations on accession to, and in the 
implementation and administration of, this Agreement, the Parties shall give special 
consideration to the development, financial and trade needs and circumstances of 
developing countries and least developed countries (collectively referred to hereinafter as 
‘developing countries’, unless specifically identified otherwise), recognizing that these may 
differ significantly from country to country.” 
 
 
can be assumed that an acceding country may declare itself as “developing” or 
“least developed”; this is, of course, subject to a plausibility check by existing GPA 
parties.58 
 
Importantly, under Article V.1 of the revised GPA it is set out clearly that 
transitional measures are not granted automatically to every developing country. 
Moreover, each (developing) country must negotiate its exact terms and conditions 
of accession, including transitional measures, with all GPA parties when 
conducting negotiations on accession. Any special and differential measures must 
thus be negotiated on an individual basis. The possibility to invoke special and 
differential treatment, therefore, depends on the attitude of the acceding party as 
well as all existing GPA parties. The revised GPA expressly notes that special and 
differential provisions “may differ significantly from country to country”.59 
Any transitional measures negotiated, need to be reflected in the acceding 
country’s coverage schedule in Appendix I of the GPA (i.e. Annexes 1-7).60 
 
v. Is special and differential treatment available only to developing countries? 
 
As noted above, one of the main purposes of the revision of the GPA was to 
facilitate the accession of new parties, notably developing countries. To this end, 
the GPA explicitly allows for special and differential measures with respect to 
developing countries. 
 
Practice, however, shows that countries may be reluctant to declare themselves as 
“developing” or “least developed”. It is, therefore, important to note that, as a 
general rule (i.e., not only for developing countries), the GPA text provides for a 
high degree of flexibility. Article XXII of the GPA sets forth the basic rule that any 
WTO member may join the GPA on the terms agreed with the GPA parties. 
Hence, any country acceding to the GPA which has special requirements is free to 
discuss those requirements with GPA parties, and to join the GPA on any terms 
                                                 
58 GPA parties may challenge the decision of a proposed member to denominate itself as a 
developing or least developed country.  The United Nations publishes criteria for a nation 
to be considered as a “least developed country” (“LDC”), at 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_criteria.shtml.  A list of 
LDCs appears at 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc2/ldc_countries.shtml. 
59 See GPA, supra note 2, art V.1. 
60 For instance, Annexes 2 and 3 could specify that on the one hand certain cities or 
municipalities and/or on the other hand certain state-owned enterprises will be required to 
procure in line with GPA rules only after a certain period of time. 
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agreed. In practice, however, GPA parties will have certain expectations as to 
(temporary) special and differential treatment for acceding parties. 
 
In this respect it is worth noting that GPA parties have already shown their 
willingness to grant countries special or differential treatment, even if those nations 
enjoy a relatively high level of development.  One example in this regard is Israel, 
which joined the GPA in 1996. Israel negotiated in its Annex 1 to the revised GPA 
that the monetary threshold for construction services for central government 
entities be set at SDR 8,500,000 instead of the usually applicable SDR 5,000,000 
during the first six years; after this period, the threshold will be reduced to the 
usual SDR 5,000,000 for construction services.61 
 
Arguably, therefore, transitional measures, such as phased-in addition of specific 
entities, or thresholds that are initially set at higher levels, need not be limited to 
developing countries. It might be the case that, subject to successful negotiations 
conducted by the acceding country, GPA parties will also prove willing to grant 
special and differential treatment to other developed countries.62 Thus, while GPA 
parties have general expectations concerning market access to be offered by 
acceding nations, it is not out of the question that GPA parties may also be willing 
to accept temporary deviations in the form of special and differential treatment for 
developed nations that also wish to become a party to the GPA. 
 
III. THE COMMON PURPOSE OF THE WTO AGREEMENT ON 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT WITH THE UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW ON PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
 
A. What is the purpose of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement? 
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law is one of the most commonly recognised public 
procurement codes internationally.63 One of its main purposes is to serve as a 
template available to national governments seeking to introduce or reform public 
procurement legislation for their internal markets.64 It is non-binding (in contrast 
                                                 
61 See note 1 in Israel’s Annex 1 of Appendix I coverage schedule of the GPA. 
62 In this instance, such special and differential treatment might not be granted under Art V 
of the GPA concerning developing countries but, as noted, simply under the general rule 
that a WTO member may accede to the GPA on terms to be agreed between that WTO 
member and GPA parties (See GPA, supra note 2, art. XXII.2). 
63 The full text is available at uncitral.org. As noted, the UNCITRAL Model law is 
accompanied by a comprehensive Guide to Enactment. 
64 See, for instance, Sue Arrowsmith & Caroline Nicholas, The UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services: Past, Present and Future in PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
 
 
with the GPA), and summarises established international principles of good 
practices in public procurement. Provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law may 
be adopted as written, when they are transposed onto national laws. The 
UNCITRAL Model Law provides nations with a varied menu of options from 
which to choose, in order to address different procurement situations and to suit 
local circumstances. The updated 2011 law reflects modern practices, such as 
eProcurement (including electronic communications, electronic submissions and 
electronic reverse auctions) and framework agreements.65 The 2011 version of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law is supplemented by a comprehensive, consensus-based 
“Guide to Enactment”, which provides background and explanatory information 
for legislators, regulators and policymakers using the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
 
B. Why is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement relevant in the context of 
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement? 
 
Approximately thirty states – including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Mongolia and 
Uganda – have enacted legislation based on the UNCITRAL model procurement 
laws.66 This is particularly common for states in Central and Eastern Europe, a 
number of which based their public procurement laws on the 1994 UNCITRAL 
Model Law before they joined the European Union.  (After they joined the 
European Union, their laws had to conform to the EU procurement directives.)  
Furthermore, a number of countries currently seeking accession to the GPA have 
also based, or intend to base, their public procurement laws on the non-binding 
UNCITRAL Model Law.67 
 
Thus, neither the UNCITRAL Model Law nor the GPA should be viewed in 
isolation. This is why the drafters of the UNCITRAL Model Law sought to 
enhance its usefulness by harmonising the Model Law’s text (to the greatest extent 
                                                                                                                       
REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: REFORM OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
PROCUREMENT (Sue Arrowsmith ed., 2009) [hereinafter PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY];  Christopher Yukins, A Case Study in Comparative 
Procurement Law: Assessing UNCITRAL’s Lessons for US Procurement, 35 PUB. CONT. L. J. 457 
(2006). 
65 See, for instance, Caroline Nicholas, Electronic Communication under the UNCITRAL Model 
Law,in PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 63; Sue 
Arrowsmith & Caroline Nicholas, Framework Agreements under the UNCITRAL Model Law, in 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 63. 
66 See Caroline Nicholas, Work of UNCITRAL on Government Procurement: Purpose, Objectives 
and Complementarity with the Work of the WTO, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 9, at 747 et seq. 
67 These include, for example, Albania, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Mongolia. 
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possible) with other international texts on procurement, particularly the GPA. The 
drafters of the UNCITRAL Model Law did this so that acceding parties to the 
GPA, having based their national public procurement legislation on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, then need not – or need not significantly – amend their 
domestic law to meet the demands of the GPA. 
 
In this regard, the question which arises, in particular, is whether basing national 
public procurement legislation on the UNCITRAL Model Law will involve any 
incompatibility with the requirements of the GPA.  If so, the next question is how 
national procurement legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law should be 
brought in line with the GPA. 
 
C. Comparison of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement and the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement 
 
In order to address these key questions, the EBRD, working together with the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat on the EBRD and UNCITRAL Initiative on Enhancing Public 
Procurement Regulation in the CIS countries and Mongolia, decided to conduct an in-
depth comparison of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the GPA. The comparison 
– which has been published, in summary form68 – illustrates the similarities and 
differences between the two regimes. It aims to serve as a guide for countries that 
intend to remedy inadequate or outdated public procurement legislation, or are 
seeking accession to the GPA. The comparison covers the following topics: (i) 
objectives, implementation and ambit; (ii) general principles; (iii) scope and 
coverage; (iv) award procedures; (v) remedies and enforcement; (vi) electronic 
procurement; (vii) socio-economic policies; and (viii) efforts to attract developing 
countries. 
 
The comparison between the UNCITRAL Model Law and the GPA shows that 
the same principles underpin the rules set out in both texts. Basic principles such 
as transparency, economy and efficiency, competition, non-discrimination, 
proportionality, integrity and accountability are key features of both the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the GPA. These principles also inform regulation in 
the texts in connection with scope and coverage, award procedures, remedies and 
enforcement, and socio-economic policies. Both texts allow for eProcurement – 
including electronic communications, electronic submissions and electronic reverse 
                                                 
68 See the webpage of the EBRD and UNCITRAL Initiative on Enhancing Public 
Procurement Regulation in the CIS countries and Mongolia, available at EBRD 
UNCITRAL Public Procurement Initiative, Comparison 2011 ML and revised WTO GPA, 
https://www.ppi-ebrd-uncitral.com/index.php/en/comparison-2011-ml-and-revised-wto-
gpa-ax. 
 
 
auctions – and recognise that effective mechanisms to monitor compliance with 
the text’s rules, and to enforce them if necessary, are key features of a successful 
public procurement system. 
 
Potential users of the UNCITRAL Model Law can be assured that the texts of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the GPA share many similarities, and are therefore 
largely consistent. The members of the working group who prepared the 
UNCITRAL Model Law were careful to ensure that it remained consistent with 
the latest GPA text, which had stabilized as of late 2007.  Differences between the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the GPA are marginal, and should not be 
substantive. Given the high degree of harmonisation between the two codes, 
basing national procurement legislation on the UNCITRAL Model Law will greatly 
assist countries which need to comply with GPA requirements upon GPA 
accession. 
 
IV. THE WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND 
POLICIES ON FACILITATING PARTICIPATION OF SMALL AND 
MEDIUM-SIZE ENTERPRISES IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
 
As mentioned above, the renegotiation of the GPA led to new work programs of 
the WTO Committee on Government Procurement.69 One of the work programs 
considers best practices with respect to measures and policies to encourage the 
participation of small and medium-size enterprises (‘SMEs’) in public procurement. 
The issue of SMEs and government procurement is a major concern for existing 
GPA parties and for many countries considering joining the GPA, in part because 
SMEs are quite often the backbone of a national economy. For instance, 99.8 % of 
all registered companies in the EU are SMEs.70 Indeed, SMEs frequently 
contribute a large portion of a country’s GDP, and play an important role in 
innovation and research & development. Although some say that procurement 
markets alone should decide which enterprises are allowed to contract with the 
government, it can fairly be stated that there appears to be an international 
consensus that SMEs should be particularly encouraged to participate in public 
tenders.71 
                                                 
69 See GPA, supra note 2, at 3. 
70 Nine out of ten SMEs in the EU are actually micro enterprises with fewer than 10 
employees. See SMEs' Access to Public Procurement Markets and Aggregation of Demand in the EU, 
EUROPEAN COMM., 5 (Feb. 2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/smes-
access-and-aggregation-of-demand_en.pdf. 
71 T. Bech, A. Demirguc-Kunt & R. Levine, SMEs, Growth, and Poverty: Cross-Country 
Evidence, 10(3) J. ECO. GROWTH 199-229 (2005). 
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There is, however, a basic tension when it comes to SME policies and the notion 
of procurement market liberalization. Any more favourable treatment for SMEs 
under the GPA seems to violate the non-discrimination principles72 in the GPA as 
well as rules on equal treatment. In particular, Article VIII.1 of the GPA requires 
that a “procuring entity shall limit any conditions for participation in a 
procurement to those that are essential to ensure that a supplier has the legal and 
financial capacities and the commercial and technical abilities to undertake the 
relevant procurement.” A provision in tender documents, for example, setting 
forth that only SMEs are allowed to participate in a given tender would not seem 
to be “essential” in the above sense. Moreover, SME preference policies might 
violate the prohibition on offsets, forbidding “any condition or undertaking that 
encourages local development”.73 
 
As mentioned above, the scope and coverage of a GPA party’s market access 
commitments is determined by its commitments as stipulated in the Appendix I 
coverage schedule. In other words, parties may negotiate exceptions for SMEs 
from their GPA coverage in their GPA market access provisions.74 
 
Indeed, some existing GPA parties have special provisions on SMEs in their 
market coverage offers. The United States, to name one example, does not apply 
the GPA to “any [procurement market] set-aside on behalf of a small- or minority-
owned business”.75 The reason for this is that the United States reserves, i.e., sets 
aside, billions of dollars for contract awards to small businesses.76 By means of this 
provision, the United States keeps a substantial part of its procurement market 
closed to maintain preference programs for SMEs.77  In practical terms, the set-
                                                 
72 In this respect it could be argued that the principle of national treatment is not violated 
when foreign and domestic SMEs are treated the same. 
73 See GPA, supra note 2, art. I.l & IV.6. 
74 In this regard, the view is also expressed that only countries with a certain market power 
would actually be in a position to negotiate adequate SME policy preferences. See John 
Linarelli, The Limited Case for Permitting SME Procurement Preferences in the Agreement on 
Government Procurement, in THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: 
CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 9, at 456-457 [hereinafter Linarelli, Permitting SME 
Procurement Preferences]. 
75 See note 1 in the United States’ Annex 7 of Appendix I coverage schedule of the GPA. In 
this note, the United States specifies that a “set-aside may include any form of preference, 
such as the exclusive right to provide a good or service, or any price preference”. 
76 See Linarelli, Permitting SME Procurement Preferences, supra note 73, at 444-458. 
77 The EU, for instance, has a different approach to encouraging SMEs’ participation in 
public procurement. Because economic integration amongst the European states is an 
essential policy goal in the European Union, the EU does not support setting aside a 
 
 
asides for small businesses mandated under U.S. law create a barrier to foreign 
firms, for as per the definition of ‘small business’, only U.S.-owned firms qualify as 
“small businesses” under U.S. federal procurement law.78 The new work program 
of the WTO Committee on Government Procurement regarding SMEs is 
therefore of particular importance. The exact content of the work program is set 
out in the Committee’s decision on a work program on SMEs.79 The decision 
makes it clear that the GPA parties “shall avoid introducing discriminatory 
measures that favour only domestic SMEs and shall discourage the introduction of 
such measures and policies by acceding Parties”. Importantly, the decision requires 
the WTO Committee on Government Procurement to conduct an in-depth survey 
of SME policies in the GPA member states regarding the measures and policies 
used to assist, promote, encourage, or facilitate participation by SMEs in 
government procurement. 
 
A draft questionnaire seeking information regarding the measures and policies used 
to assist, promote, encourage, or facilitate participation by SMEs in government 
procurement was circulated to GPA parties in October 2014. It was planned that 
responses to the final questionnaire were to be provided by all GPA parties by 
March 2015. Upon receipt of the responses, the WTO Secretariat will prepare a 
compilation of the responses and circulate the responses and the compilation to 
the GPA parties. It is intended that the assessment of the results of the SME 
Survey will be discussed amongst the GPA parties in the near future before 
starting with the implementation of the outcome of the SME Survey. 
 
                                                                                                                       
portion of public contracts in each EU member state for SMEs. Instead, the EU aims to 
promote the participation of SMEs in public procurement by applying other measures, 
such as permitting the participation of SMEs in consortia or as subcontractors; lowering 
SMEs’ administrative burdens by allowing for self-declarations as to pre-qualification 
requirements; requiring adequate minimum and selection criteria which are appropriate 
with regard to the subject matter of the procurement; and, limiting a prospective awardee’s 
required minimum turnover (gross annual revenue) level to twice the expected value of the 
relevant contract; etc.). See Martin Burgi, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Procurement 
Law--European Legal Framework and German Experiences,4 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 284-294 (2007); 
Max V. Kidalov, Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative 
Assessment, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 443 (2011). 
78 See 13 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 121.105 (“a business concern eligible for 
assistance from SBA [the U.S. Small Business Administration] as a small business is a 
business entity organized for profit, with a place of business located in the United States, 
and which operates primarily within the United States or which makes a significant 
contribution to the U.S. economy through payment of taxes or use of American products, 
materials or labor”). 
79 GPA, supra note 2, Annex C. 
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The work program on SMEs is of particular relevance for both existing and 
acceding GPA parties. As noted earlier, practice shows that countries with 
economies in transition pay special attention to favouring (domestic) SMEs. 
Although procurement covered by the GPA (typically larger, above-threshold 
procurements) may only be of limited practical importance to most SMEs,80 the 
work program on SMEs illustrates the tactical advantages of being a party to the 
GPA. Countries that are not parties to the GPA will have limited standing to 
submit comments and suggestions on how SME policies should be dealt with 
under the framework of the GPA in the future. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The last few years have been very significant ones for the WTO’s Government 
Procurement Agreement.  A revised text of the GPA, which better reflects the 
needs and realities of modern procurement processes, entered into force in April 
2014. This revision of the GPA also resulted in expanded coverage of government 
entities and types of procurement by various GPA members. Importantly, the 
revised GPA provides for a high degree of flexibility in the GPA accession 
process, and offers important transitional measures for developing countries that 
wish to join the GPA. 
 
The WTO Committee on Government Procurement has moved ahead on multiple 
accessions recently. Montenegro and New Zealand successfully completed GPA 
accession negotiations in October 2014. Moldova’s final offer is likely to be 
accepted in short order, and Ukraine is moving ahead with its GPA accession 
process in a timely and deliberate fashion. Tajikistan, which became an observer to 
the GPA only in September 2014, circulated its initial Appendix I coverage offer in 
February 2015. GPA parties admitted Pakistan as an observer in February 2015, 
and many other observer countries to the GPA are currently considering initiating 
GPA accession negotiations in the very near future. 
 
The GPA, besides being a bulwark against protectionist measures in public 
procurement, has been an important catalyst for reform in public procurement law 
in many countries worldwide. This is because countries seeking accession to the 
GPA must ensure that their national procurement regimes comply with the 
requirements of the GPA, which is based on the fundamental principles of non-
discrimination, transparency, competition and integrity. Compliance of national 
                                                 
80 Only procurements for which the estimated contract value equals or exceeds the relevant 
thresholds specified in the relevant GPA Party’s annexes to Appendix I coverage schedule 
are covered by the GPA. To take an example, for construction services, the relevant 
threshold is set, in most cases, at SDR 5,000,000. 
 
 
public procurement legislation with the minimum requirements prescribed in the 
GPA is, in contrast to market access commitments, non-negotiable. This means 
that GPA minimum requirements must always be met by a country wishing to 
become a party to this agreement. During the accession process, countries with 
public procurement regimes that are already GPA-compliant must demonstrate 
this to existing GPA parties. Any country with a public procurement regime that is 
not fully GPA compliant will likely be asked by existing GPA parties to amend its 
legislation to ensure conformity with GPA requirements, during the GPA 
accession process. 
 
The UNCITRAL Model law is harmonised to the greatest extent possible with the 
GPA, and is therefore very well suited to serve as a template for countries that 
need to update their domestic procurement legislation to comply with the 
requirements of the GPA. While there are some differences, the texts of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the GPA are, by design, largely consistent. Basing 
national procurement legislation on the UNCITRAL Model Law will not involve 
any substantive incompatibility with the requirements of the GPA, and will greatly 
assist countries that intend to accede to the GPA in complying with GPA 
requirements. 
 
Joining the GPA is a logical and natural step for countries that are in the process 
of reforming their domestic laws and are adapting their legal regimes to 
international best public procurement practice. The GPA has been acknowledged 
by many countries as an important defense against a downward spiral of 
protectionist measures. The GPA, besides being the best available bulwark against 
closure of national procurement markets, has also been widely accepted as a vital 
tool for the promotion of good governance. 
 
Any country wishing to accede to the GPA will need to set up a coherent 
negotiation strategy. In principle, market access is fully negotiable, but GPA parties 
have certain expectations, notably as to monetary thresholds, coverage of sub-
central level as well as coverage of state-owned-enterprises and utility companies, 
and the number of exceptions to coverage. As a practical matter, those 
expectations are framed by prior negotiations, and because the pace of accessions 
has accelerated in recent years, new candidate nations have found it easier to 
negotiate the accession process. 
 
In conclusion, GPA membership entails many advantages. Importantly, there is 
currently a high level of interest in GPA accession, and the WTO Committee on 
Government Procurement has moved ahead recently on multiple accessions. 
Countries interested in GPA membership are encouraged to make use of this 
and  
 
momentum, as the coverage demands put on those acceding to the GPA may rise 
in the future.  Accession to the GPA requires the consent of all GPA parties, and 
as new parties (including major, highly industrialized nations) join the GPA, they 
may raise the bar by requiring additional coverage concessions by new members. 
Acceding now will give new members the opportunity to influence the terms of 
other WTO Members’ accessions. Furthermore, new GPA parties will benefit 
from the negotiating power of the combined GPA parties, as they negotiate to 
open public procurement markets worldwide. 
 
Although the GPA forms a highly specialised part of the WTO framework, and 
joining the GPA involves institutional, legal and trade challenges, experience shows 
that GPA accession can be successfully and promptly concluded if the acceding 
nation demonstrates sufficient political will, and carefully prepares both before and 
during the GPA accession process. 
